Of Neighbours and Netizens, Or, Duty of Care in the Tech Age: A Comment on Cooper v. Hobart by Currie, Robert J.
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 3 Number 2 Article 2 
4-1-2004 
Of Neighbours and Netizens, Or, Duty of Care in the Tech Age: A 
Comment on Cooper v. Hobart 
Robert J. Currie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cjlt 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Currie, "Of Neighbours and Netizens, Or, Duty of Care in the Tech Age: A Comment on Cooper v. 
Hobart" (2004) 3:2 CJLT. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Canadian Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Schulich Law 
Scholars. For more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Of Neighbours and Netizens, Or,
Duty of Care in the Tech Age:
A Comment on Cooper v. Hobart
Robert J. Currie†
Introduction Duty of Care: Donoghue to Cooper
he duty of care is the analytical starting point for allast-paced growth in the technology sector has led to T negligence claims. In the much-revered4 case ofF regular discussion of whether and to what extent the
Donoghue v. Stevenson,5 Lord Atkin laid out the ‘‘neigh-law is able to ‘‘keep up with’’ technology. In particular,
bour principle’’ that, in effect, created the modern law ofthe common law, with its tradition of conservatism and
negligence:incremental change, is confronted with developments
that do not lend themselves readily to the application of You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions
precedent and analogy. One need only survey the debate which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure
your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? Theraging in the U.S. regarding the applicability of common-
answer seems to be — persons who are so closely andlaw doctrines of trespass1 to the Internet to wonder if the
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to havelaw as it currently exists provides the tools needed to them in contemplation as being so affected when I am
deal with tech issues in a manner that is fair, just, and directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called
consistent with both larger legal norms and society’s in question. 6
technological needs.
Lord Atkin’s famous dictum, while revolutionary in
Clearly, a larger conversation is taking place scope, actually built on various prototypical forms of the
regarding the law’s ability to regulate and control tech- negligence action that had developed. It was already set-
nological activities, what form that control should take, tled law that a duty of care was owed as between doctors
and even whether it is appropriate at all. 2 The goal of and patients, or lawyers and clients, for example. 7 Dono-
this article is to contribute to the Canadian end of this ghue, however, ‘‘established the proposition that the
conversation, albeit in a modest way, by inquiring into duty of care owed in negligence actions is not confined
the continued viability of negligence law in this setting to a closed list of specific relationships, but is based upon
(i.e., whether the common law of negligence as it cur- an open-ended and general concept of a relationship of
rently exists has sufficient capacity to handle ‘‘tech proximity which is capable of extension to new situa-
torts’’). The focal point of this comment will be the tions’’. 8 Negligence, then, was universally adaptable,
recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in always potentially available — a tort for all seasons.
Cooper v. Hobart, 3 which appears to have made some
significant changes to the elements of ‘‘duty of care’’, the I do not propose to discuss fully the development of
foundational negligence concept. The Court framed its the duty of care within Canadian law, and refer the
decision as refining duty of care analysis in order to reader to the leading authorities in that regard. 9 How-
properly deal with ‘‘novel claims’’ (i.e., those for which ever, a short review of the major touchstones is necessary
there is not an established or analogous duty of care in to provide background for the thoughts that follow. Lord
the existing case law). Given that the growth of elec- Atkin’s ‘‘neighbour principle ’’ was developed and
tronic commerce and Internet usage continues to spawn expanded by the House of Lords in a series of cases10
‘‘novel’’ legal issues, Cooper is an appropriate starting that culminated in the 1978 judgment of Lord Wilber-
point for a discussion of whether the law, as it stands, force in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council. In
provides courts with the tools to determine when and that case, His Lordship set out a two-stage test for deter-
where new duties of care should arise. mining duty of care:
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First, one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrong- Registrar was successful before the Supreme Court of
doer and the person who has suffered damage there is a Canada, which took the opportunity to ‘‘revisit’’ the
sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such Anns test. 19that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, careless-
ness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter In revisiting, the Court appears to have fundamen-
— in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, tally changed the analytical framework of what it none-if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary
theless continues to call the ‘‘Anns test.’’ It accomplishedto consider whether there are any considerations which
this by breaking out the terms ‘‘foreseeability’’ and ‘‘prox-ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty
or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to imity’’ from the first step of the test, asserting (despite
which a breach of it may give rise. . . . 11 over a decade of jurisprudence to the contrary) that each
was a discrete element that had to be proven in order toAs Professor Klar has noted, this was a significant
ground the duty of care. Foreseeability remained asdevelopment in that the establishment of ‘‘a sufficient
straightforward as it had always been; if ‘‘a reasonablerelationship of proximity or neighbourhood’’ gave rise to
person would have viewed the harm as foreseeable’’,a presumptive duty, which could only be rebutted by
then this portion of the test was made out. 20 Proximity,pressing policy concerns. ‘‘[I]n reaffirming that there is a
however, was something different; specifically, it becameuniversal formula of duty applicable to all cases of
a second sub-step in the first step of the Anns test:alleged negligence, [Anns] divided the elements of duty
into two segments: (i) a relationship of proximity or (2) are there reasons, notwithstanding the proximity
between the parties established in the first part of this test,neighbourhood and (ii) policy’’. 12 However, Anns also
that tort liability should not be recognized here? The prox-contained the most explicit recognition to that date that
imity analysis involved at the first stage of the Anns testthe neighbour principle contains within it limiting fac- focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the
tors: that it was not just a mechanism by which the scope plaintiff and the defendant. These factors include questions
of negligence could be expanded, but simultaneously of policy, in the broad sense of that word. 21
provided the ability for courts to circumscribe it as well. Proximity is to be determined by reference to the
Justice Linden has recently remarked on this aspect: established categories of negligence. If a relationship
Duty is a negative doctrine, a limiting tool, a way of circum- between plaintiff and defendant has given rise to a duty
scribing the scope of negligence law. It denies, restricts, cur- of care in a previous case, then proximity is settled; if the
tails, confines, controls the spread of negligence law by relationship is analogous to a previously established dutykeeping cases out of the hands of over-sympathetic juries
of care, then ‘‘a prima facie duty of care may be pos-and trial judges. By means of duty, courts may decide, as a
question of law, that there is no duty owed by this defen- ited’’. 22 This is not to say, the Court assures us, that novel
dant to this plaintiff for this loss. The determination of no duties of care cannot be introduced, since ‘‘. . . the law of
duty, however, addresses a global policy, not an evaluation negligence . . . [is] still permit[ed] . . . to evolve to meet theof specific fact situations . . . [O]ver time the duty issue
needs of new circumstances’’. 23 However, the relation-changed from ‘‘identifying where liability is imposed to
ship will have to be carefully scrutinized to see whetherthose where it is not.’’ 13
it justifies a finding of proximity:Nonetheless, it became apparent that the ‘‘presump-
Defining the relationship may involve looking at expecta-tive duty’’ approach was expansionist in nature. The
tions, representations, reliance and the property or otherSupreme Court of Canada adopted Anns in its 1983 interests involved. Essentially, these are factors that allow us
decision of Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen, 14 and proceeded to evaluate the closeness of the relationship between the
in a series of cases thereafter to expand the reach of plaintiff and the defendant and to determine whether it is
just and fair having regard to that relationship to impose anegligence law, finding duties of care in ‘‘novel’’ situa-
duty of care. . . . 24tions where none had existed before. 15 In all of these, the
two-step approach to duty of care was utilized, and it Since these step-one policy concerns arise from the
seemed relatively clear that if foreseeability could be relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,
found in the first step, it created sufficient proximity or step two of the Anns test requires consideration of what
neighbourhood for the presumptive duty of care to the Court called ‘‘residual policy considerations’’ 25
arise. 16 Foreseeability was, in turn, a modest hurdle, even outside that relationship. The Court gave as examples
an ‘‘empty vessel’’, 17 since it was decidedly rare for a the spectre of unlimited liability, the existence of other
plaintiff who had indeed suffered damage to be found to legal remedies, 26 and in Cooper specifically, the need of
be unforeseeable to the defendant. 18 the Registrar to balance public and private interests with
the fact that the Registrar was making quasi-judicial deci-With the release of Cooper in 2001, however, this
sions, inter alia. 27pattern appeared to be brought up short. Cooper was
one of a group of investors in British Columbia who In effect, what the Court did in Cooper was insert a
alleged financial damage due to a failure on the part of new, third step into the two-step Anns test, purportedly
the B.C. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers to properly regu- as more explicit recognition of there being policy consid-
late the brokers under its purview. Cooper applied to erations inherent in both parts of the test. This was not
have the claim certified as a class action, and the Regis- simply a semantic or academic distinction, however, 28
trar countered that the claim disclosed no cause of because it introduced a conservative, incrementalist
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negligence law (to use Justice Linden’s phraseology) represents a new category’’; 36 and second, that the dis-
rather than its expansion. As Professor Klar comments: tinction between the kinds of policy concerns to be
considered at the second and third steps was not at allDenying that there is a duty at the first stage because there is
a lack of proximity recognizes that a coherent legal system, clear, and this could only lead to obfuscation and confu-
of which tort law is only a part, must create limits to tort sion. 37 Justice Linden has very recently surveyed the ‘‘ava-
law’s reach. It refuses to concede to the proposition that lanche’’ of motions spawned by Cooper and noted thatthere is a presumptive tort law duty merely because of fore-
Professor Klar’s words were prophetic, in that the intro-seeability. It asserts right at the start that some types of
duction of proximity analysis has produced ‘‘scores ofdisputes are not amenable to a tort law resolution . . . An
approach that is more resistant to the recognition of a pre- cases analyzing duty situations, often needlessly, in cases
sumptive duty in the first stage is decidedly more cautious where the duty was long settled and where, therefore,
with regard to the extension of negligence law. 29 duty should not have been analyzed’’. 38
Commentators30 (including this one) are in general It does seem clear that the effect of Cooper has been
agreement that this more cautious approach is indeed to restrain the extension of duty of care, as in the
what the Court was driving at in Cooper, in no small Supreme Court of Canada’s own decisions using the
part because it mirrors the retreat from the expan- framework (Cooper, Edwards39 and Odhavji Estate v.
sionism of Anns by the House of Lords during the 1980s Woodhouse40) where the extension of duty of care was
and early 1990s. 31 In contrast to our Supreme Court, the primarily41 denied on proximity grounds. There is con-
House of Lords explicitly rejected Anns on judicial sensus, however, that without more clarity being
policy grounds, but they did re-implement a more incre- imported into the proximity analysis, this trend is likely
mental approach by inserting a criterion of ‘‘proximity’’ to be somewhat muddled in its execution. As Professor
between the Anns stages. 32 While not as explicit as Cana- Feldthusen comments:
dian courts have been about the general policy compo-
[C]ritical terms that trigger the Anns/Cooper analysis such asnent that is inherent in the duty exercise, 33 the House of ‘‘new’’ or ‘‘novel’’ duties of care, existing ‘‘categories’’ of duty,
Lords nonetheless sounded the horn for their conserva- and ‘‘analogous’’ decisions are completely fungible terms.
Courts remain relatively free to resort to precedent wheretive retreat loudly, as opposed to the subtle, ‘‘back-door’’
they wish, ignore it when they do not, and to distinguish it ifapproach utilized by the Supreme Court. 34
necessary. 42
In the result, Canada now has a three-step approach
to duty of care. In ‘‘novel’’ cases, it will play out as fol-
lows: Negligence = Cyberlaw? 
(1) determine whether harm to the plaintiff would
uty of care is about establishing thresholds forhave been a reasonably foreseeable result of the D whether relationships are the proper focus of adefendant’s actions;
liability inquiry — in effect, answering the question(2) scrutinize the relationship between plaintiff and
‘‘who should be able to sue whom?’’ As has been recog-defendant for factors indicating ‘‘closeness’’ and
nized (perhaps most successfully) by Canadian courts,making it ‘‘just and fair’’ to impose a duty of
this is essentially a policy question masquerading as acare; and
question of law, and Cooper is effective insofar as it
(3) examine the policy factors external to the rela- reiterates and reinforces this understanding of the ques-
tionship to determine whether a prima facie tion.
duty of care arising from steps (1) and (2) should
It is highly arguable, in my view, that the massivenonetheless be disallowed.
integration of technology into the structure and fabric of
Moreover, the Court appeared to find in a subsequent Canadian society puts us at a ‘‘threshold’’ where policy is
case applying Cooper35 that the plaintiff bears the legal indeed the key question. Technology can produce rela-
burden at all three parts of the test (i.e., he or she must tionships that are ‘‘novel’’ in the truest sense, in that they
prove foreseeability, proximity and a lack of residual are not analogous to any which have come before. To be
policy factors that would otherwise negative the claim). sure, this is not unique from an historical point of view.
This is a marked departure from the previous Anns struc- The rise of professions such as medicine, law, and engi-
ture, where the plaintiff simply bore the burden of neering produced relationships that in turn gave rise to
proving foreseeability and the substantive policy argu- new duties of care as between professional and client;
ment was generally required of the defendant. the industrial revolution changed irrevocably the
Dissatisfaction with the wrinkle in duty of care dynamic between employer and employee, and ulti-
introduced by Cooper has been evident. In an early com- mately produced both common-law and statutory duties
ment, Professor Klar noted two major problems: first, of care owed by the former to the latter. To the extent
that the issue of whether a particular relationship fell that technology is viewed as a product, there is nothing
into or was analogous to a previously recognized cate- new about the duty of care owed by manufacturer to
gory was problematic, since ‘‘there are many existing consumer. Yet the profound functional integration of
categories which can be so broadly defined that it is technology into our daily lives elevates the products






























































84 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
ghue. Computers are not merely goods, nor are code- represented an aberration that has now been properly
writing or systems design merely services; they are in controlled. The speed and complexity with which tech-
some sense the creators of new modes of human interac- nological relationships are created and developed, the
tion, new relationships, and the tools by which these argument might go, are precisely why the law must pro-
relationships function. ceed with caution. New duties of care unleashed by
judges unschooled in the vagaries of technologicalThe question is whether the new formulation of
advance (and hoodwinked by tech-savvy counsel) are asduty of care will aid the courts in coming to terms with
likely to be malevolent genies escaped from bottlesthese new kinds of relationships and in determining
uncorked as they are to be salvation for the injured. Farwho should be protected from what kind of harm. The
better to proceed cautiously, on the basis of establishedrapid growth and integration of technology and the
principles, with careful consideration of the policy impli-unpredictability of result seem to demonstrate a con-
cations of every step. Immediate regulatory needs shouldtinued need for the tort of negligence, for an expansive
be filled in by the legislature; the common law mustapproach to duty of care, in the same way that the public
know and keep to its place.needed to be protected from early modern civil engi-
neering where advances in the field still did not prevent Moreover, Cooper itself may provide part of the
bridges from falling down. This exact analogy was answer, in that it instructs the lower courts that cases
employed by software specialist John McHugh of the which fall into existing categories of negligence, or are
Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon Uni- analogous thereto, do not require proximity analysis, but
versity during a recent address. 43 He underscored his at most need only be evaluated on the basis of the
point with a description of the current state of software residual policy considerations. Personal injury is still per-
evolution that speaks volumes of the void that the law sonal injury; pure economic loss arising from negligent
must fill: misrepresentation does not become something different
because the representation was made by way of e-mailWhile much of the software that we build is ‘‘pretty good,’’
we lack the link between process and product that would instead of orally.
permit us to predict accurately the quality of the resulting
product. We cannot give prescriptive advice to developers. I admit some sympathy for this argument, but in
We cannot provide meaningful warranties. We cannot pre- my view, the matter is made more complex both by the
dict the safety, security or reliability of systems that make structure of Cooper and the subject matter under discus-extensive and critical use of software. 44
sion here. First, it is not at all clear that the courts will
This is, from a legal standpoint, a startling admission recognize ‘‘existing categories’’ when they see them, and
from an expert in the field of software design. What it a great deal depends on how broadly or narrowly the
says to me is that, conceptually, the need for tort law is as facts are construed and presented during the course of
great now as at any previous time of technological the case and the reasons deciding it. Professor Klar argues
expansion, where new forces produced new relation- convincingly that, while Cooper and Edwards them-
ships and, inevitably, new kinds of injury. Those injured selves were used as the platform for introducing prox-
will need to be compensated; better and safer practices imity analysis on ‘‘novel’’ issues, both could just as easily
should be encouraged, careless conduct deterred. have been presented as being in line with existing duties
of care. 45 The post-Cooper case law to date demonstratesIt is ironic, then, that at this time when we most
that the lower courts are ‘‘confused about this’’, andneed the robustness of Anns and its progenitor, Dono-
often fail to see established category or analogy where itghue, we are given Cooper. Just as the potential for novel
exists, compounding this with proximity analysis even inclaims is arguably at its historical height, the lower courts
cases where they recognize the duty of care. 46 While it isare instructed to consider the relationships involved
early days yet, developments thus far are not encour-more carefully, more conservatively, and ensure that the
aging.imposition of a duty of care is justified by reference to
two different sorts of policy grounds. Recall that this is a The other response is that, while it may reek of 21st-
significant break with the previous state of negligence century conceit to suggest that the common law is
law, where the plaintiff could raise at least a prima facie simply not up to the task of dealing with new tech-
duty by simply making out foreseeability, a modest evi- nology, there is some indication that simply proceeding
dentiary burden. The plaintiff must now, it appears, by way of categorization and analogy will not be suffi-
prove that imposing the duty of care is both justified by cient. As noted earlier, the American courts have been
the state of the proximity factors and not amenable to struggling with the tenuousness of analogizing the
being struck on the ‘‘residual’’ policy grounds. If properly activity of web spiders to classical notions of trespass; 47
applied, Cooper must impede the ability of negligence courts the world over have wrestled with determining
law to embrace new, technology-based relationships. when the appearance of writings or remarks on the
The counter-argument here might be that this is Internet constitutes ‘‘publication’’ for the purposes of def-
precisely the way that the common law is supposed to amation claims. 48 Can viruses and worms really consti-
develop — by way of caution, increment, and analogy — tute a ‘‘nuisance’’ in the manner of seeping industrial
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of the medium causes courts to search for analogies to sions of its popular media player, RealPlayer, which
guide decision making. However, the application of real- could allow attackers to create corrupt music or video
world analogies to the particular characteristics of virtual files that, when played, would allow the attacker to take
space may lead to unintended consequences’’. 49 control  of  the vict im’s  personal computer . 5 4
RealNetworks quickly released a patch to fix theThe difficulty is not only how to compare com-
problem, which one report noted could ‘‘affect a largeputer-based relationships with traditional physical-space
portion of the 350 million unique registered users of’’relationships, for the purpose of analogizing under
RealPlayer. 55 Suppose that an attacker created a corruptCooper, but the inertia created by the proximity step.
mp3 (digital music file), which he or she released by wayThe potential negligence liability of Internet Service
of a file-sharing service like Kazaa, and that the victimsProviders (ISPs) provides a good example. There simply is
included both registered and un-registered users of Real-no precedent that enables us to effectively analogize
Player, as well as a corporation whose employeewhat an ISP does and many of the relationships within
downloaded and played the corrupt file.which it operates. 50 As a result, different policy factors
will need to be considered; for example, as some com- The various other negligence issues, such as stan-
mentators have suggested, ‘‘[t]he ISP makes a very attrac- dard of care, causation, and remoteness, aside, even the
tive defendant because it is more readily identifiable in duty-of-care issue begins to read like a first-year Torts
the realm of cyberspace where user anonymity is often exam. Who are the defendants, and who owes whom a
the norm, because of the jurisdictional problems that duty of care under Cooper? The obvious beginning
arise from the global nature of the Internet, and because point is the attacker. While commentators generally
the ISP may have deep pockets’’. 51 Whether or not these agree that in principle such an individual, if he or she
are indeed appropriate policy factors for consideration, could be found, would be liable, 56 this would seem to
they indicate that the kind of policy debate that must be come fairly close to being a ‘‘novel claim’’ in Canadian
had is substantially at the macro level, and should fall negligence law. He or she clearly comes within the first
under the ‘‘residual’’ policy considerations in the second step, since harm was eminently foreseeable and, in fact,
part of the test. The problem with Cooper is that it intended.57 Moving to proximity, care against potential
potentially prevents courts from ever reaching this stage. harm from malicious code is not (to my knowledge) a
If analogy is not to be had, a judge may not find suffi- recognized duty of care in Canada. Analogy is difficult;
cient identifiable ‘‘closeness’’ in the relationship to one thinks of a defendant negligently creating a power
ground proximity. The ‘‘residual’’ policy considerations surge that could cause property damage to persons on
that would better inform the issue are left unearthed. the same power grid. However, the latter example
More generally, there is a potentially large variety of derives its duty of care from geographical, or at least
‘‘relationships’’ to try to fit within the contours of the physical, proximity, not to mention the fact of the poten-
existing duty-of-care structure. As Professor Owens tial for physical harm (i.e., property damage). The Real-
recently noted in these pages, 52 the list of potential Player attacker, by contrast, has set in motion a force that
defendants in a case involving worms or viruses could may cause pure economic loss to a large group of people
include anti-virus software manufacturers, proprietors of who have nothing more in common than RealPlayer on
infected electronic commerce Web sites, security consul- their hard drive and an Internet connection. It is not a
tants and auditors, application service providers, and recognized category of pure economic loss. Precedent
ISPs, inter alia. 53 There is usually no physical closeness, and analogy fail us.
often no geographical neighbourhood, and even the
Thus, the analysis must move to those factors thatfunctional proximity will be questionable in some cases.
might make it ‘‘fair and just’’ to impose a duty of care.The legal regime for dealing with ‘‘novel’’ claims is going Cooper provides examples — expectations, representa-to get a workout in the coming years and decades, but it
tions, reliance, the property or other interests involved,may not be up to the task.
the ‘‘closeness’’ of the relationship — but aside from the
exceedingly general ‘‘other interests’’, these are not overly
helpful. The aspect of the Internet that makes it such anCase Studies incredible tool — its ability to electronically link mil-
lions of people — is what may defy any notion of ‘‘close-he question that the foregoing suggests, then, is
ness’’ as the term is to be understood under Cooper. It isT simply this: can the Cooper duty-of-care test,
difficult to conceive of the attacker, who simply releasesdesigned to proceed cautiously from known categories of
malevolent code out into the electronic stream to beneighbours, also figure out whether it is ‘‘fair and just’’ to
picked up by the unaware, as being ‘‘proximate’’ to anyimpose a duty of care as between netizens? The answer is
of the hypothetical victims. In this case, we never movenecessarily speculative, but it may be useful to pose a
to the larger, societal or ‘‘residual’’ policy implications ofcouple of fact scenarios and estimate how they would
the decision.fare under a Cooper analysis.
On Friday, February 6, 2004, RealNetworks The flip side of the equation is that despite the
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that it would be ‘‘fair and just’’ to allow a cause of action records but knocks out the primary power system.
as between the victims and the attacker. To do this, Backup power covers off most vital machinery, but sev-
however, we must examine the Internet as the sui eral patients are injured when some systems fail because
generis thing that it is. The fairness and justice of of the blackout.
imposing the duty of care here derives from the very The hacker being unidentified (and likely judg-nature of the relationship and the setting within which it ment-proof), both the hospital and the individual victimsoccurs, and not from analogy to categories of negligence look to the law firm for recovery. It is certainly foresee-that have gone before. The attacker, as an Internet user, is able that negligent protection of a network could lead tonot only neglecting a duty to other netizens but knows harm to those parties, such as the hospital, who werethat the file is virtually certain to cause injury of some electronically connected to it. Again, one struggles for akind58 to a wide variety of people. The nature of the precise analogy to existing caselaw, but if one takes aInternet allows him or her to reach many more victims broad approach, then property damage by way of com-than would be physically possible. The far-flung inti- puter negligence will likely turn up on the proximitymacy of Internet users, despite lacking any hallmarks of radar. The patients present a thornier problem. Foresee-traditional ‘‘proximity’’, nonetheless makes it just and fair ability is not an issue, but there does not seem to be ato impose the duty of care. previously established category from which to draw. Is
Cooper does not necessarily foreclose this kind of ‘‘negligence indirectly causing physical injury’’ enough in
inquiry, but the fit is an uncomfortable one. 59 The this setting? The closest analogy might be where the
former Anns framework would arguably have produced power company itself negligently allowed the third party
a different result; once the victim made out that the to cause the blackout. The difference for proximity, how-
harm was foreseeable, the onus would have been on the ever, is that the link between the firm’s network and that
defendant to present policy factors that justified not of the hospital is only incidental to their commercial
imposing a duty of care in this situation. The policy relationship. The link does not truly come within the
debate would have to have been held in its entirety at scope of the firm’s provision of ‘‘services’’ to the hospital,
the second stage, where both relationship-based and which might otherwise be sufficient to ground the third-
societal policy factors could be balanced against one party claim of the patients. The relationship between the
another to tailor the result to the tech setting. Procedur- patients and the firm is therefore that much less proxi-
ally, unlike Cooper, the defendant would not have the mate.
advantage of being entitled to two efforts at refuting the If there is no analogy, then closeness must be soughtnovel duty of care (with the burden of proof on the through the proximity analysis for this novel case. Onceplaintiff). Substantively, the Court would have more flex- again, there is little in the way of expectations, represen-ibility in terms of taking a truly holistic view of the tations, reliance, or property interests upon which torelationship in question, rather than being hamstrung by base a finding of ‘‘closeness.’’ The fact of actual physicaladherence to the new proximity analysis. injury must surely be taken into account, but one could
What about RealNetworks, which created the faulty expect a heated argument from the firm that it would
software and made it easy to download and install, hardly be ‘‘fair and just’’ that by simply running its own
leaving the victims open to the bad code? This part of computer network (which virtually every company does)
the analysis fares better under Cooper, mostly because it it should be opened up to claims from any third party
has a products liability angle. RealNetworks obviously who might be affected, somehow, somewhere. 61 Must
owes a duty of care to registered users of its product, every computer network operator have a duty to take
because negligent construction of the product could care with regard to anyone who may be affected by its
foreseeably cause harm to the ultimate consumer, and negligence? Surely not, but on what principled basis can
because products liability is an established category of we impose limitations? Those we are used to, such as
negligence. Both the unregistered users and the corpora- geography, do not really apply any more. Cooper does
tion are arguably foreseeable users or third parties. The not help in this task. The debate that must be had is in
law regarding pure economic loss will apply to include the realm of the larger, extraneous or ‘‘residual’’ policy
or exclude certain claims; any policy debate will be had concerns of the second step, but the proximity analysis
at the residual policy step where it properly belongs in keeps us from ever getting there.
any event. One can easily imagine twists and turns on these or
Let us take a different scenario. Suppose an uniden- other scenarios. What if the law firm’s negligence allows
tified party hacks into the network of a large law firm a virus to emanate from its network that shuts down and
and uses it as a conduit to hack into the systems of the damages half of Lower Manhattan? My point here, how-
firm’s clients with which the firm’s network is inte- ever, is not to speculate on the ‘‘what-ifs’’ of tech torts,
grated. 60 Suppose as well that one of these clients is the but to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s approach
Regional Health Authority and that the hacker gains in Cooper may ultimately tie the hands of the courts. An
access to the computer system of a major hospital, where approach based on the language and conceptual
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duce undue rigidity when assessing truly novel claims or like-minded states, may ultimately be the best vehicle
those with novel aspects. This is not to say that open- through which to proceed. Yet I am reluctant to concede
minded judges cannot make the leaps required, but the the inability of the common law to continue its mostly
structure of the Cooper test actually holds them back in proud tradition of compensating the injured, providing
their ability to do so. This does more than accomplish education and deterrence, and even simply moving
the somewhat laudable goal of restraining the careless money around the economy in a principled way. There
extension of duty of care — it prevents the adaptation of is no doubt that some of the issues to be considered are
the common law of negligence to new subject matter, manifestly different than those that have gone before.
which defeats the most profound strength of the The beauty of Donoghue, however, was that the ‘‘neigh-
common law. bour principle’’ was amenable to being extended on a
principled basis, anywhere, at any time.
It is certainly important that the rigour that cur-Conclusion 
rently exists in negligence law be reinforced, so that the
n 1893, Lord Esher wrote of duty of care, ‘‘a person is expansion of negligence law to embrace technologicallyI entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the based relationships does not bring us to that ‘‘day when
whole world if he owes no duty to them.’’ 62 Over a liability will be determined routinely on a case by case
century later, we have arrived at a time when all the basis, ‘under all the circumstances’ basis, with decision
world is, potentially, your neighbour. This idea was at makers (often juries) guided only by the broadest of
the heart of Donoghue, and was a startling one for its general principles.’’ 63 However, if Anns was too liberating
time. Today, society takes this for granted, but the law a structure for duty of care, I have argued here that
has yet to catch up. Cooper represents too great a retreat. It may prevent
It may be that, in promoting the extension of negli- negligence from blossoming into an effective adjunct to
gence law into the tech sector, I am attempting to fit both legislative and self-regulation. It may be, as the old
square pegs into round holes. Legislation, in tandem song goes, that duty of care has left us — just when we
with jurisdictional and technical co-operation among needed it most.
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